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Introduction
This paper develops the argument that the long term structural evolution of an industry depends, in predictable ways, on the evolution of a vertically-related, downstream industry. More precisely, the evolutionary dynamics of the downstream industry, in terms of number of firms and products, entry, exit and concentration, is transmitted to the upstream industry via the structure of the network of vertical exchange relations.
The claim that the vertical structure of an industry is a determinant of its concentration has been made repeatedly in the literature. At an aggregate level, the countervailing power theory posits a simple relation between concentration indexes in the two industries, without specifying the micromechanisms that transmit the effects 1 . At a micro level, both theories of vertical integration based on contracts and industrial organisation theories of sourcing decisions, switching costs and compatibility among systems and components, derive optimal vertical configurations. However, they are rather silent on the aggregate effect on concentration and, moreover, on the dynamics of the vertical configuration over time 2 . It seems that there is a need for an approach that explicitly links individual exchange decisions between buyers and sellers in two vertically-related industries with the aggregate dynamics. Recently, industry studies and evolutionary models have emphasised that patterns of vertical integration and of division of labour are powerful engines of change of the industry structure 3 .
We develop an original approach which is based on a construct, the network of vertical relations between individual firms in buyer and supplier industries. The formation and evolution of the network is explained through technology and market factors such as the level of economies of scope, the degree of technological co-specialisation between products in the upstream and downstream industries, the buyers' sourcing strategies and the degree of market fragmentation.
There are a number of advantages in adopting a network approach to the study of coevolution of vertically related industries. First, the unit of analysis is the single transaction, but it is not isolated from all other transactions taking place in the industry. As Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) pointed out, "in market networks, interdependencies are more than bilateral, and how one organises one set of transactions depends on how the other transactions are set up". Second, specific factors featuring vertical relations such as degree of asset specificity, technological complementarities, frequency of relations, or pattern of sourcing, are carefully reflected in several network measures at the transaction level, at the firm level (buyer and supplier), and at the overall network level. For example, the 1 For some references see Galbraith, 1952; Bain, 1968; Lustgarten, 1975; LaFrance, 1979; Scherer, 1980; von UngernSternberg, 1996 . 2 Among others, see Williamson, 1985 Williamson, , 1999 Klein et al., 1978; Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Hart and Tirole, 1990; Riordan, 1998; Demsky et al., 1987; Riordan and Sappington, 1989; Klemperer, 1997; Farrell et al., 1998. 3 See Arora and Gambardella, 1998; Malerba et al. 1998; Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999; Bresnahan and Malerba, 1999; Langlois and Steinmueller, 1999. adoption of single or multiple sourcing strategies is represented by the number of relations for buyers.
Diffuse adoption of multiple sourcing leads to a dense network, while single sourcing shapes a less dense network, which is also partitioned if the supplier industry is not monopolistic. Third, the relationship between the dynamics of vertical relations and industrial dynamics can be studied through the analysis of the relationship between variables describing upstream and downstream industries, i.e. level of concentration, dynamics of market shares, entry and exit, and variables describing the network.
This paper analyses two pairs of vertically-related industries, the commercial jet aircraft and engine industries, and the commercial turboprop aircraft and engine industries, since the first introduction of the jet (1958) and turboprop (1948) technologies to 1998.
Turboprop and jet engine industries exhibit different structural dynamics with respect to the pattern of entry and exit of firms and products and the level of industry concentration. We study the evolution of the upstream industry by looking at the evolution of the downstream industry, and make the argument that the transmission of effects from one industry to the other is determined by the structure of the network linking the two.
Technological and market factors shape the emergence of different structures of vertical networks in the jet and turboprop industries. We identify two basic configurations, partitioned and hierarchical, and show how different network configurations in the jet and in the turboprop are responsible for sharply different transmission mechanisms of the changes of the downstream to the upstream industry.
An econometric analysis is developed to test some hypotheses on the transmission mechanisms in the two pairs of industries.
Industrial dynamics
After the Second World War the commercial aircraft industry was characterised by the transition from the piston to the gas turbine engine propulsion technology, transition already experienced during the War by the military industry. Two different technological solutions, the turbojet an the turboprop, emerged and developed along two different technological trajectories. While at the beginning competition between turbojet and turboprop occurred especially in one segment of the market (aircraft with 51-90 seats), over time the markets with smaller seat capacity have been dominated by the turboprops, while the markets with larger seat capacity (91-120 to more than 400 seats) by the jet. The divergence of technological trajectories originated markedly different market applications (large commercial aircraft and aircraft for regional transport) and led to the birth of independent segments of the industry. In fact, out of 12 engine manufacturers only 4 operated in both the jet and the turboprop.
On the demand side the two industries are completely separated, insofar as no aircraft manufacturers operated in both markets. The only partial overlapping between the two industries took place when some firms from the turboprop have been entering the small regional jet segment of the market in the 1990s. As a matter of fact, we are dealing with two pairs of vertically-related industries which can be considered as independent on each other, with regards to specific determinants of industrial dynamics, although there may be correlation in external factors influencing both of them (e.g. trend in transportation demand).
This paper analyses a case of vertically-related industries, i.e. a supplier industry which sells only to one downstream industry, which in turn cannot substitute the products with those of competing sectors. Aircraft and engine industries, in both jet and turboprop, are characterised by a stable pattern of vertical separation, insofar as vertical integration of engine production never occurred over the entire history of these industries 4 . There is also no diversification, either in market demand for the upstream industry, or in supply sources for the downstream one. Of course, there is still the possibility that the survival of firms is subsidised by military sales or government interventions. Although this applies to specific circumstances, it is difficult to accept as an explanation of long term evolution
The study is developed as follows. This section describes three basic industry variables -i.e.
number of firms, concentration and introduction of new products -and shows sharp differences in the jet and turboprop vertically-related industries 6 . The structural dynamics of the industry highlights some relevant stylised facts with respect to the pattern of entry and exit of vertically-related firms and products. Section 3 examines in depth the structural dynamics of the networks connecting vertically related industries. Finally in section 4 we develop an econometric model to test the hypothesis that the relation between upstream and downstream industry variables depends on the structure of the network. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the number of firms and the entry and exit events in the four industries. The graph clearly reveals a similarity in the evolution of the number of firms in the 4 There are not specific studies addressing vertical integration of the engine industry. Technological bases are entirely different in the engine and aircraft industries, the costs of development of engines and aircraft are huge and excess correlation of risk has been considered a reason for vertical separation (Klein, 1977) . 5 Although economies of scope are clearly relevant in R&D, commercial engines are developed for being integrated into commercial aircraft, with no easy cross-over with military products. Moreover, in the cross country distribution of aircraftengine relations, we do not observe any specialisation of supply relations by country; that is, aircraft manufacturers did not necessarily buy engines from national suppliers. On the contrary, global sourcing strategies have occurred since the beginning of the industry. The history of the relations between entry and exit events of aircraft and engine manufacturers highlights some interesting stylised facts. In the turboprop market we observe that: By contrast, the jet market is characterised by the following facts: by an existing aircraft manufacturers.
−
As no exit of engine manufacturers occurs during all the history, there is no relation with the exit of aircraft companies.
7 It is interesting to note that the patterns observed in the two engine industries are different from the patterns predicted and explained by different streams of research on the dynamics of industry population (Klepper, 1996 (Klepper, , 1997 Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Carroll and Hannan, 2000) . Explanations of the diversity have been proposed in Bonaccorsi and Giuri (2000a) for the turboprop and in Bonaccorsi and Giuri (2000b) 1973 , Casa and Garrett in 1974 , Yunshui and Dongan in 1984 , IPTN and Allison in 1995 This is the case of Allison and Lockheed in 1969 , Turbomeca and Nord Aviation in 1976 , Walter and Let in 1995 , and Lycoming and Pilatus in 1996 . Note that these firms were not owned by aircraft manufacturers but were independent, privately-hold companies. On the contrary Rolls Royce, the leader of the market for many years, progressively lost market shares and left the industry after the exit of its former customers. The last supply relation gained by Rolls Royce was Fairchild in 1968. After the financial crisis of the 1970s, Rolls Royce concentrated its efforts only in the jet market and did not introduce new products in the turboprop industry. This caused its exit from the market in 1988. In summary, the pattern observed in turboprop suggests the existence of close technological complementarity between engines and aircraft, which induces the introduction of new engines in correspondence with launch of new aircraft. In the jet, aircraft and engines of different generations are designed to operate in many seat-range conditions.
11 They are the Rolls Royce M45 which powered the VFW614 in the regional market, the Olympus 593 which powered the Concorde. 12 Examples are a number of versions of the Trent, the PW 4000 series, the IA V2500 series. 13 To name some examples, in the 1960s the Pratt & Whitney JT3D-3B has been integrated in 38 versions of the B707, B720 and DC-8, the JT8D-7 in 18 versions of the Caravelle, B727, B737 and DC-9, while in the 1980s and the 1990s the General Electric CF6-80C2 has powered 22 versions of the A300, A310, B747, B767 and MD-11. 
Networks
In order to explain the surprising difference in the way the structural dynamics of two pairs of industries are related, we suggest to examine the properties of the network of vertical exchanges which connects them.
Network analysis has been applied in many fields of social sciences, including economics, sociology, and organisation, for analysing different structures of interactions among agents (individuals, firms, groups of actors, technical artefacts). In the analysis of industries, network concepts and techniques are increasingly used in the field of inter-firm agreements (joint ventures, licensing, technological alliances, consortia and the like) (Powell, 1996; Orsenigo et al, 1998 Orsenigo et al, , 2000 .
We apply network analysis to the study of vertical relations between buyers and suppliers.
The unit of analysis is the transaction of engines occurring between an engine and an aircraft manufacturer each year. Relations are characterised by high frequency and stability. The yearly average number of transactions of each relation is 85 in the jet and 37 in the turboprop, while the minimum and the maximum are respectively 11 and 436 in the jet and 3.33 and 132 in the turboprop.
The range of variation depends on the market shares of the companies and on the size of the market segment. Relations are also very stable over time. In fact interruptions of relations are very rare, with the exception of cases of exit of actors, while new relations tend to be added to the existing and to persist over time. The total number of relations which compose a network depends on entry and exit of actors, and on creation and interruption of relations. The stability of the relations implies that the structural configuration of the network is persistent over time, and it is not subject to short run changes, and the way relations are distributed among actors is not random, but depends on structural factors of the industries under study.
The network may assume different topologies which can be represented by different network measures. For the purposes of this study, we analyse three structural properties of the network: the relational intensity, the distribution of the relations across actors and the separability of the network.
For the analysis of vertically-related industries we study bipartite graphs, in which edges connect vertices from different sets of actors (buyers and suppliers) and there are no ties within each set (Borgatti and Everett, 1997; Asratian et al., 1999) . The edges in the network are determined by the order of an engine placed by an aircraft company to an aero-engine manufacturer at a given date. The structure of the relations is represented for each year by a biadjacency matrix, whose cells represent the binary variable "a relation exists / does not exist".
We selected the following network measures to study the structural properties of the network:
density, k-core, cut-points and bi-components.
The density is essentially a count of the number of edges actually present in a graph, divided by the maximum possible number of edges in a graph of the same size. Density is a synthetic measure of network structure which provides information about the group relational intensity and the cohesion of a graph, but does not include information about the variability among actor degrees.
We also calculate measures at the sub-graph level, to analyse the distribution of the relations across actors. In particular we study the number and size of k-cores, which give a clear representation of the presence of cohesive sub-groups. A k-core is a connected maximal induced sub-graph which has minimum degree greater than or equal to k (Wasserman and Faust, 1995) . The degree of an actor is the number of edges incident with that vertex. Each member of a k-core is related to at least k other actors on the other set. We calculate the number of k-cores in the jet and turboprop networks for every possible value of k and for each year of their life. For k=1 the number of cores indicates the degree of partition of a network. The higher the number, the higher the degree of partition of the network, as the network can be separated in n sub-graphs without deleting any vertex. The presence of cores with degree greater than or equal to k denotes cohesiveness of a graph, that is the distribution of relations across actors is not dispersed but is concentrated in sub-groups of intensely connected actors. In particular, a network characterised by a restricted core and a periphery of disconnected actors can be defined as hierarchical.
The separability of the network is finally analysed through the number of bi-components and cutpoints of the graphs. A bi-component (or block) of a graph is a maximally non-separable sub-graph. It requires deletion of at least two vertices to disconnect it. A cut-point is a node which is connected to more than one bi-components, therefore its deletion disconnects the graph.
The number of bi-components and cut-points provides an indication of the connectivity of a graph.
The higher its number, the higher the probability that a graph will be disconnected for the deletion of a vertex, that is for the interruption of a relation or the exit of a player. The size of the bi-components, similarly to the analysis of k-cores, gives an indication of the size of highly connected sub-groups.
Precisely, bi-components with more than two actors correspond to k-cores with k greater than 1 14 . At the aggregate level, we observe that the level of density in the jet is higher than in the turboprop, which indicates higher relational intensity among buyers and suppliers.
Networks in turboprop and jet industries
14 Measures of k-cores, bi-components and cut-points are computed by using the software Ucinet 5 (Borgatti et al., 1999) . The analysis at the sub-graph level provides details on the distribution of relations across subgroups of actors. In particular, it gives evidence of the degree of partition and of the formation of a hierarchical structure of the network.
The degree of partition of the network in the jet is lower than in the turboprop as the number of kcores with degree equal to 1 is smaller. In the turboprop network the number of 1-cores increases over time and ranges between 3 and 6 for a large portion of the time, although it tends to decrease over the Combining these results, we observe a partitioned structure of the turboprop network and a hierarchical structure of the jet network. 
Causes of differing network structures
Where do different structural configurations of the network come from? What caused these different network structures to emerge?
We believe that differences in the networks structure in the two pairs of industries depends on the following structural factors: the degree of economies of scope, the sourcing strategy adopted by aircraft manufacturers, and the level of market segmentation. We summarise here the differences between jet and prop with respect to these structural factors, which have been studied in related papers (Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 1999, 2000a) .
Economies of scope
We calculated some statistics on the number of versions per product to measure the degree of robustness of basic designs (programs) as an indication of the presence of economies of scale and scope in design and manufacturing activities of aircraft and engine companies. Robustness occurs in terms of adaptability of the basic design to different customers and to different market segments. It allows some degree of economies of scale (high commonality of parts) and scope (high product variety) on the R&D and production side and offers the possibility of enhanced learning from user experience. In fact users, working with similar platforms, can be more apt to ask for specific modifications of design. This type of design applies not only to sequential introduction of models, but also to different more or less contemporaneous versions Gardiner, 1989, 1990) .
We found that the average and the maximum number of versions per program in the jet is higher than in the prop, both in aircraft and engine. In addition, the number of programs in turboprop is higher than in turbojet, although the size of the market is smaller. This suggests that the turboprop market is more fragmented in different programs and that the degree of economies of scale and scope is much lower. Similar results have been observed by calculating indicators on the number of applications (aircraft programs and versions) per engine programs.
How did economies of scope influence the network structure?
In the presence of economies of scope, engine programs are potentially applicable to different aircraft programs of different manufacturers. This allows engine companies to relate to many buyers, and potentially to all of them. On the contrary, in the absence of economies of scope, turboprop companies may relate to a reduced number of aircraft companies. The only exception is the case of companies producing many different programs, but this would be an extremely expensive strategy which is not plausible in industries characterised by huge costs of development and large break even point.
Buyers' sourcing strategies
By single sourcing we mean that aircraft manufacturers select just one engine supplier for each new programme, possibly by asking the same manufacturer to develop several versions of the basic engine for the corresponding versions of the aircraft programme.
In the turboprop, the demand for engines takes place within an almost generalised single-sourcing strategy. Out of 22 aircraft manufacturers, 10 operate using multiple sourcing and 12 with single sourcing. Companies operating with dual sourcing still equip the aircraft program through single sourcing.
In the jet, the pattern of sourcing of aircraft manufacturers changed considerably over the industry evolution. While at the birth of the industry aircraft makers tended to operate through single sourcing, or in some cases dual sourcing for specific aircraft models, the solution of the major technical problems of the first stage of industry evolution, while reducing the degree of uncertainty, allowed designing aircraft to integrate different engine configurations. Innovation at the design level permitted the increasing interchangeability of engines on newer model aircraft (Bluestone et al., 1981) .
Airframes started to be built to accept any one of several turbine configurations offered. This trend led to the shift from single to dual and multiple sourcing strategies of large aircraft manufacturers.
Multiple sourcing policies began to be adopted at the aircraft program level, and in some cases at the version level.
The differences in the jet and prop economies of scope and sourcing strategies suggest that in the prop there is a technological co-specialisation of engine and aircraft while in the jet aircraft products architectures are open and characterised by a standardised interface for engines. Jet engines are optimised for an envelop of operational conditions, while turboprop engines are designed for a narrow range of operational parameters.
With respect to the effects on the network structure, in the turboprop the diffusion of single sourcing at the firm, at the segment and at the program level induces a partitioned network. In the jet the shift from single and dual toward multiple sourcing strategies of major aircraft manufacturers led to the formation of connected network structures.
Market segmentation
The structure of demand for engines is represented by the aircraft manufacturers. In the turboprop market, customers operate mainly in just one segment of the market. This is in sharp contrast with the pattern found in the jet aircraft industry (Sutton, 1998; Bonaccorsi, 1996) , which is one of declining number of large suppliers operating simultaneously in all segments of the jet market. Since large jet aircraft manufacturers operate across all segments and plan their engine acquisition strategies in an integrated manner, they favour complete range suppliers.
As a result of this enormous pressure, all large engine suppliers operate in all market segments. The only jet engine suppliers that were able to survive in one or a few segments are those that supplied smaller jet engine manufacturers (e.g. British Aerospace or Embraer), which do not target the large transport aircraft market. On the supply side the presence of economies of scale and scope, reflected in the presence of robust designs of engines which power many aircraft configurations, supports a configuration of interdependence of sub-markets (see Sutton, 1998) .
The same pressure is not found in the turboprop industry. Faced with customers that demand engines for just one aircraft size at a time, with no significant interdependence among segments, turboprop engine suppliers could survive with a limited range of products. The low level of economies of scope supports this configuration.
How does this affect the network?
Fragmented markets limit the scope for higher relational intensity across actors. Suppliers (or customers) operating in one or two segments can in practice relate to a reduced number of customers (suppliers) although the potential number of customers is higher. On the contrary, in industries characterised by interdependence of sub-markets each actor can in principle relate to actors on the other side in any segment.
Observing the transmission mechanism
The comparison between the two pairs of industries shows an intriguing difference. In the turboprop industry, the dynamics of the upstream industry closely parallel the dynamics of the downstream one. The turboprop aircraft industry exhibits a remarkable growth in the number of firms, a rapidly declining and then stable level of concentration, and an increasing number of products, with some oscillations. Almost the same patterns of change apply to the related engine industry. This is not true for the jet. In the aircraft industry the number of firms is quite stable, concentration is slightly decreasing and the number of products has a peak and then declines. By contrast, a different pattern is found in the engine industry: the number of firms is always growing, concentration is sharply decreasing, and the number of products has an increasing trend.
We develop the hypothesis that the relation between the structural dynamics in the upstream and downstream industry is regulated by the structure of the network of vertical relations, that is, changes in the downstream industry are transmitted to the upstream industry with an intensity which depends on the structure of the network. In other words, our interpretation of the network as a transmission mechanism of changes from a downstream to an upstream industry is that a hierarchical network filters the transmission of effects, while a partitioned network transmits directly and entirely the effects. In a hierarchical network any change on the buyer side (entry of firms, introduction of new products, change in market shares) affects more than one supplier. On the contrary, in partitioned network a change in the buyer side is very likely to affect only one supplier.
To test these hypotheses we build three regression models in which the dependent variables In order to test the significance of a network variable, in a modified specification we add density as an independent variable in the three regressions. We chose the more synthetic network measure, since we are interested in the explanation of the long run dynamics of the upstream industry.
The ADF test on the variables under study revealed that they are all non stationary and first order integrated, as they become stationary after one difference. We use an unrestricted Error Correction
Model to test the short and long run relations between the variables. The specification of the general model is the following:
This equation is a reparametrisation of an ARDL(1) process, where π 1 and π 2 are the long run parameters, and π 2 / π 1 represents the speed of adjustment towards the long run solution of the model.
The test for the long run solution is based on these hypothesis:
Asymptotic critical values for the t and F distributions are tabulated by Pesaran et al. (2000) 15 . In Appendix 3 we report the t and F critical values for I(1) variables in the case of unrestricted intercept and no trend in the equation.
The second specification of the model also tests the significance of density in the explanation of the dynamics of the upstream industry. 15 Although it is more general, we do not use the Johansen method of cointegration because it requires a large number of observations. However, when the number of the variables is no greater than 2, and the independent variable is weakly exogenous, results of the unrestricted ECM are considered robust. In the case of more than two variables the application of the Johansen method to our data produced ambiguous results, probably due to the small number of observations. Therefore, we preferred to use the unrestricted ECM model to study the effects of downstream concentration and density on the upstream concentration, although we cannot check for the number of cointegrating relations. 
These specifications of the models are built on the idea that causality goes from the downstream to the upstream industry. We believe that this hypothesis is realistic in these industries. In fact, while the aircraft industry represents the whole market for the engine industry, influencing directly its dynamics, a reverse causality direction can be assumed to exist in case of radical innovation in components or monopolistic structure of the supplier industry. That is, while one can find interesting examples of innovation in components which determined important changes in the downstream industry (ex. computer and microprocessor, see Malerba et al., 1999; , we believe that this is not the case for the jet and turboprop industries. In fact, in these industries, after the transition to the gas turbine technology, which lead to the disappearance of the commercial piston engine and aircraft industries, no other radical innovation occurred which strongly affected the dynamics of the buyer industry. However, we carry out Granger causality tests to check the statistical significance of the hypothesised direction of causality. Tables 2-4 show the results of the regressions for the three variables in the turboprop industry.
From the two regressions in table 2 it is clear that there is a positive and significant short run impact of the downstream concentration on the upstream concentration. The F-tests of the restrictions on the coefficients π 1 and π 2 are larger than the critical values in both cases, suggesting cointegration between the three variables. However the coefficient π 2 for the downstream concentration is significant only in the first regression, while in the second regression density explains upstream concentration in the long run.
Results of the regressions in table 3 confirm the existence of a short run relation between downstream and upstream number of firms. The variables are not cointegrated and in the long run density seems to affect negatively the number of firms. The higher the density, the lower are in fact the opportunities available for supplying incumbent firms, already attached to other suppliers. In addition, in a partitioned network density acts as a barrier to entry at a lower level compared to a hierarchical network.
Results in table 4 sharply reveals positive and significant short run and long run relations between the number of new products in the turboprop aircraft and engine industry. The F-statistics are higher than the critical values in both regressions, but in the second the value is smaller as the coefficient for density is not significant.
We carried out a test of Granger causality in the first regression specification for a statistical verification of our hypothesis on the direction of causality. In all three cases it is the downstream variable which drives the upstream and not the reverse. In the jet results are quite different. The Chow test for the structural stability of the relation between downstream and upstream concentration revealed a structural break in 1978 16 . We carried out the above regressions by including a dummy variable for the intercept and a dummy variable for the coefficient of the downstream concentration (Table 5) . Results are very interesting as they show the existence of a short and a long run relation between the two variables but the sign of the relation is different in the two periods. Before 1978, when the density of the network is smaller, and the core of the network is not stable, the sign of the relation is positive. In the second period, the hierarchical network filters the transmissions of the changes of the downstream to the upstream industry. In this case the coefficient for the downstream concentration is negative. In fact larger market shares of the downstream leaders are distributed among suppliers in the core almost equally, leading to a reduction of the upstream concentration. The coefficient for density is significant only in the long run, and this reflects the hierarchisation of the network which is not captured by an aggregate indicator like density. The tests for Granger causality indicate that both directions are significant, suggesting also influence of the upstream on the downstream industry.
The regressions for number of firms and number of new products show that there is no relations between upstream and downstream variables (table 6 and 7). Density seems to affect negatively the number of firms in the short run, suggesting again the role of density as a barrier to entry. In Table 7 the F-values is largely higher than the critical value, but it reflects the higher significance of the lagged dependent variable. provided by Casa, which was supplied by Garrett in the less than 30-seat segments and by General Electric in the segment 31-50 seats.
In addition, in such a fragmented market the exit of a customer means in the short run the disappearance of the market for the supplier, which is therefore forced to exit the industry. In fact, the interruption of relations due to exit of aircraft manufacturers represents a loss of market shares that cannot be compensated by acquisition of supply relations with existing customers, already attached to competing suppliers in single sourcing. In partitioned networks characterised by the presence of quasi exclusive relations, the higher the density, the lower the probability that a new firm can join the network. The network becomes in fact saturated at a lower level of density.
On the contrary in the jet industry, the entry of jet aircraft manufacturers may produce The results of the regressions on total number of products, and number of new products in the aircraft and engine industries confirm even more sharply the previous results. In the jet industry there is no relation between number of new products upstream and downstream, while in the turboprop the two variables are cointegrated. In the prop, the technological co-specialisation of engine and aircraft, which is also reflected in the high number of bi-components and of k-cores with minimum degree equal to 1, explains the entry of isolated couples of vertically-related firms and products. This means that new engines are realised for specific new aircraft and are very rarely used for other applications.
On the other side, a new aircraft is designed to integrate a specific engine. Therefore, the dynamics of the number of products is highly related.
The same pattern of cospecialisation is not observed in the jet.
Conclusions and further research
The main message of the paper is that networks matter in the explanation of the evolution of industries. Depending on technology and market factors, networks of vertical relations assume a variety of structural configurations and change over time. Once formed, networks evolve themselves and act as constraints to the evolution of industries, transmitting effects from related industries according to their configuration.
We showed that specific characteristics of the industries, which refer to economies of scope, technological cospecialisation, buyers' sourcing strategies and market segmentation, are reflected in partitioned network structures in the turboprop and in hierarchical network structures in the jet.
The econometric analysis showed that the structural dynamics of downstream and upstream industries, measured in terms of number of firms, industrial concentration and introduction of new products, are positively related in the turboprop while in the jet there are not significant relations, except for concentration in the first period, when the core is not stabilised and the relation is positive, while in the second period the relation is negative. We propose that partitioned network structures transmit directly the changes of downstream to upstream industries, while hierarchical networks filter the effects.
The analysis developed in this paper will be applied in different industrial contexts. Further research will aim to study the relations between airline companies and aircraft manufacturers. Two important factors may have affected the sourcing of airlines: the role of commonality across different engines and aircraft, which allows important cost savings for airlines, and the trend toward outsourcing of maintenance activities, which reduces the cost savings of having a single supplier. The analysis of the vertical relations between engine, aircraft and airline industries will offer different cases characterised by different structures of upstream and downstream industries. While in this paper we analysed small-number buyer and supplier industries, the analysis of the airline industry will remove this restriction on the downstream side, as the industry is composed of hundreds of companies and is characterised by very turbulent dynamics, also fuelled by the deregulation process that has occurred in the United States and in Europe. Again, the comparison between markets for jet and turboprop aircraft will allow further specifications of market structures and of demand regimes, as the development of air carriers in the markets for turboprop and jet followed differentiated dynamics.
A further development of this work will have as its object of analysis the dynamics of the network of vertical relations between avionics and aircraft manufacturers. In that case we will extend the application of the theory to a supplier industry characterised by the presence of a large number of firms. The avionics industry is also composed of a number of market segments characterised by different technologies which witnessed strong changes in the last few decades.
The analysis of the network in different industrial contexts will provide cases which will enrich and enlarge the general applicability of the proposed approach.
Appendix 1. Data
Empirical analysis is carried out in the turboprop and jet aircraft-engine industries since their birth to 1997, by using a proprietary database built upon several sources of data. The database provides data on more than 85,000 transactions, carried out by 5,900 operators, 27 aircraft companies and 11 engine manufacturers, and involving 102 aircraft models (more than 450 versions) and 260 engine types. For each transaction the database provide three monthly dates: contract, first flight (also indicated as production date), and delivery. We use the first flight as unit of analysis as it is subject to less fluctuation. To reduce discontinuity in the data, monthly dates are transformed into annual dates. Data on three aircraft programs not included in Atlas have been added by using Aerospatiale (1990) data on orders and deliveries.
Transactions include also second-hand transfers between operators. As we are interested in the relations between engine and aircraft manufacturers, we consider only the first introduction of the product and do not consider each subsequent transaction occurring between airline companies. The final number of transactions used in the analysis is 27,000.
We integrated the Atlas database with data on the number of engines powering each aircraft, by using other sources: Jane's All the World Aircraft publications and the technical press (in particular, Flight International and Aviation Week and Space Technology). Data on seat capacity of aircraft, and information about segmentation by seat are provided by company reports (in particular Boeing, Airbus, Aerospatiale).
Russian aircraft and engine transactions are excluded from this analysis, because of some incompleteness and uncertainty about data in the version of the database used for this research. This is not a problem with respect to the objectives of this thesis, since historically Russian engines have been exclusively integrated into aeroplanes produced in Russia, thus the relational dynamics in the engine industry of the rest of the world are not influenced very much.
Entry is defined as the first date an engine manufacturer supplies an engine to an aircraft manufacturer Pesaran et al. (2000) *k is the number of independent variables in the regressions. k=1 corresponds to the first regression specification, while k=2 to the second specification.
